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Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman
Bethany R. Berger*
Twenty-six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez,' the case continues to generate cries that the federal government
has abandoned Indian women in the name of Indian culture. 2 This outrage is in part
generated by the sense that, as Judith Resnik puts it, that "the case was an 'easy' one
for the Supreme Court to proclaim its commitment to tribal sovereignty" because it
accorded with federal norms about the treatment of women. 3 In this essay, I want to
disagree and argue that, to the contrary, it was a particularly hard case -- and not
because the justices were such committed feminists. Rather, the case was a tough one
for the Supreme Court and for non-Indian policymakers because the federal
government and the colonial governments before it had always used the needs of
Indian women as an excuse for erosion of Indian sovereignty. Indian women, by the
common account, needed the federal government to come save them from drudgery,
from sexual slavery, from oppression. But, I will suggest, the women whose plight
called out for European and American protection were not real women -- instead they
were imagined by the colonizers, tailored to their ideas of gender and culture and their
needs in justifying the colonial project.4 I hope to show that this tradition not only
colors discussions of the case and the situation of Indian women generally but may
also make it more difficult for tribes to identify and address practices that do need to be
changed.
The first imagined Indian woman in Indian policy was the North American
continent itself.5 As pictured in this 1580 etching, (Fig. 1) she was voluptuous, naked,
and reclining, representing both the almost sexual rewards available to those that could
conquer her virgin soil and the need for Europeans to come clothe her in their superior
civilization.
6
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Fig. 1. Theodore Galle, Vespucci Discovering America (1580); Courtesy of Beinecke Rare
Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.
Once the Americans began to assert independent claims to North America, they
began to see her as "their" Indian woman, needing defense against the violations of the
Europeans. In 1774, on the eve of the American Revolution, Paul Revere published
this cartoon of America as an Indian woman defiantly spitting tea back at the British
officers seeking to look up her skirt. (Fig. 2.).
Fig. 2. Paul Revere, The Able Doctor, or America Swallowing the Bitter Draught (1774).
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This sexualized perception extended from the land to the people themselves. In
part the qualities ascribed to Indian people, male and female, were the qualities that
European Americans ascribed to their own women. Portrayals of Indian men as
feminized or emasculated by their improper lifestyles appeared from the earliest
reports through the 1800s.7 More significant was the perception that Indians, like
women, were creatures of nature rather than reason, like women, subject to wild
impulses and passions, and, most importantly, like women, needed European and
American men to protect and guide them.8 The object of this guidance, as preached by
ministers and military leaders alike, was to turn them into "men." 9 The absence of
women from this last equation is telling. It reveals both that women were invisible to
these policymakers and that they were intended to remain invisible, If men assumed
their proper role, women would naturally disappear from the political and economic
stage, and become the passive helpmeets that God and civilization intended.
Indian women, then as now, were much more than the silent companions of
their men. But the reality of Indian women's lives was invisible to the non-Indians that
observed them. James Adair's 1775 History of the American Indians, for example, is
one of the most detailed written records of the Southeastern tribes during the
eighteenth century.' 0 He had lived and traded with the tribes for thirty years and had
married a Chickasaw woman.11 Despite this, Adair did not recognize that the tribes he
lived among were matrilineal and thus missed the clanship system that was one of the
most important elements of their religion and law. 12 In the same way, even when
women exercised considerable political power, observers assumed that only men had
political authority or property rights.' 3 For example, when a female member of the
Sauk tribe protested against the removal proposed by Major General Edmund Gaines,
saying that women had a right to know of bargains made regarding the lands the
women farmed, he responded that "the president did not send him here to make treaties
with the women, nor to hold council with them!" 4
The last story points to another deliberate invisibility at work. While Indian
policy from contact through the beginning of this century was dedicated to turning the
"Indian people" into farmers, these policymakers missed the fact that there already
were many Indian farmers. The problem was that they were all women. 15 For many
Indian communities, including the tribes first encountered by non-Indians such as the
Cherokee, the Iroquois, and the Algonquian Tidewater Tribes of Virginia, men were
responsible for hunting, while women were responsible for farming. 16 While this
division of labor could be consistent with domination of women, 17 in most tribes, each
sex determined appropriate behavior and controlled the property used within their
respective fields of labor, and each activity was recognized as necessary and important
for the welfare of the tribe.18 Women's responsibility for agriculture was thus an
important source of power and prestige.
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But when European Americans faced these uncomfortable facts, they molded
them to conform to their policy needs. They interpreted the division of labor with
European eyes, through which women's work was distasteful and inferior, and hunting
was the occupation of idle rich. The fact that women farmed while men hunted was
evidence that Indian men were lazy and despised honest work, and Indian women were
abused slaves.' 9 Making men take their proper place in the fields was necessary to free
women from this unnatural drudgery. In the words of Commissioner of Indian Affairs
William Medill, "The most marked change, however, when this transition takes place
is in the condition of the females. She who had been the drudge and the slave then
begins to assume her true position as an equal; her labor is transferred from the field to
her household -- to the care of her family and children." 2° In the same way, although
rights in land often vested in women and descended through the maternal line, when
treaties, statutes, and government officials allotted land to "heads of households" they
assumed or sometimes insisted that the heads of household be Indian men.
2 1
The civilization project was deemed necessary to save Indian women from
sexual slavery as well. The very first reports of the people of the Americas dwelled on
what they believed to be the inappropriate sexuality of Indian people.2 2 Indians
typically wore far less clothing than their European counterparts, and in some tribes,
sex before marriage was not forbidden.2 3 Upon marriage, the family of the groom
often provided gifts to the family of their bride, a practice that was perceived as a form
24of prostitution. Marriages could also be terminated with little formality, and in many
25tribes husbands could have more than one wife. European and American settlers
saw these practices as very nice for the man, but degrading to Indian women.
26
The sexuality of Indian women created both an opportunity and a mission for
the colonizers. The settlers delighted in imagining themselves as the objects of
affection to these half-clothed, lustful women and believed they could use these
affections as a way of gaining access to Indian people. Hence the persistent
fascination of the Pocahontas story. John Smith may well have invented his story of
being saved by Pocahontas, or at least misunderstood (or misrepresented) what was in
27fact a Pamunkey adoption ritual. Even if Smith's account was accurate, Pocahontas
would only have been ten or eleven at the time of the incident, not the sexually mature
young woman she is usually portrayed as. Although Pocahontas did in fact marry an
Englishman, John Rolfe, some years later, the marriage only occurred after the English
had kidnapped her and held her for ransom for several months. Moreover, despite
the veneer of romance given the story, both her father, Chief Powhatan, and the
Governor of the Virginia Colony, Thomas Hale, appear to have understood the match
as a diplomatic alliance. 29 Nevertheless, the fictionalized story of Pocahontas' willing
choice of an English soldier over her tribe remains one of the most popular images of
Indians in American culture, refiguring American conquest as voluntary, a consensual
seduction rather than a rape.
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Fig. 3. Victor Nehlig, Pocahontas Saving John Smith (1870); Courtesy of Brigham Young University
Museum of Art.
Once seduced by the attractions of white men and their superior culture, Indian
women could be saved, introduced to Christianity, and cleansed of their degrading
pasts. Two pictures from the 1830s show the sexual allure and colonial opportunity
presented by Indian women. Robert Matthew Sully's 1832 painting shows Pocahontas
as she is often imagined, as a voluptuous temptress before her marriage. (Fig. 4.)
Fig. 4. Robert Matthew Sully, Pocahontas (1832); Courtesy of Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond, Virginia.
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It was Pocahontas' marriage and conversion, however, which best fit the
mythology of American nation building. In 1837, the federal government
commissioned the below Baptism of Pocahontas at Jamestown, Virginia, 1613 (Fig.
5), in which she is separated from her naked compatriots, clothed in the pure white
robes of civilization, and illuminated by the light of her conversion to Christianity. In
1840, the finished tableau was hung in the Rotunda of the U.S. Capitol where it
remains today.3 °
Fig. 5. John Chapman, Baptism of Pocahontas at Jamestown, Virginia, 1613 (1836-1840).
Federal policymakers worked hard to save women from their perceived sexual
exploitation. Several of the "Indian Offenses" proscribed by the Rules for the Courts
of Indian Offenses established by the federal government in 1883 have to do with these
goals. The only non-criminal duty explicitly given to the Indian judges was the power
to solemnize marriage.31 Traditional dances were forbidden not only because they
were a sustaining part of the culture the U.S. sought to abolish but because they were
considered "repugnant to common decency and morality."32  Polygamy was
criminalized, as was paying anything of value to a woman or her relatives to cohabitate
with her. 33 The only prerequisite for Indian judges was that they not be polygamists. 34
The infamous federal boarding schools sought to transform Indian women as
well. In 1881, Senator Carl Schurz declared that schools must be established for
Indian girls to teach women to "make the atmosphere and form the attraction of the
home" and "lift up the Indian women to respect themselves," 35 while Indian
commissioner Thomas Morgan declared that "co-education . . . is the surest and
perhaps only way in the which the Indian women can be lifted out of that position of
servility and degradation which most of them now occupy, on to a plane where their
husbands and men generally will treat them with the same gallantry and respect which
108
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is accorded to their more favored white sisters.' 36 The faces of the girls in the pictures
below cast doubt on whether they felt the boarding school experience was lifting them
out of servility and degradation.
Fig. 6. Yakima School Girls, Fort Simcoe, Washington; Courtesy of Northwest Museum of
Arts & Culture, Spokane, Washington.
Fig. 7. Girls Sewing, Albuquerque Boarding School; National Archives and Records
Administration (NRG-75-AISP- 14).
The perception of Indian women as wanton concubines was likely as great a
distortion as that of them as oppressed slaves. Many tribes prohibited adultery, 37 and
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the relative ease of obtaining a divorce likely made it uncommon. Indeed, the
punishment for adultery among tribes as different as the Creek,38 Sioux 39 and Navajo 40
-- cutting off the offender's nose -- is one of the more serious abuses of women of
which there are credible reports. The presence of multiple wives, rather than creating a
harem in which the lucky man could luxuriate, might in fact increase the power of
women in the household, particularly as sisters would often marry the same man. 41 In
Navajo households, for example, it appears that husbands, living as they did with the
families of their wives, were subject to much teasing as lazy in-laws.42 Given that in
many tribes, couples would move in with the bride's family after marriage, the "bride-
price" paid by the husband's family, rather than a means of purchasing women and
their sexual favors, can more appropriately be seen as contributions to the support of
the new family, a practice not unlike the dowry that European American families
provided along with their newly married daughters.43
In addition, the sexual transgressions the colonizers condemned were often the
result of federal actions rather than the opposite. While prostitution did exist among
Indian tribes,44 it vastly increased as brothels sprang up around federal army bases.45
Abortion surely increased as the hardships of colonization made women worry about
the future of their children. A military doctor remarked at the high rate of abortion
46
among the Navajos imprisoned at Fort Sumter, not recognizing that the women,
starving and forced away from their ancestral homelands, did not wish to bring
children into the world that the gods deserted.47 More generally, the dislocation and
disruption of traditional mores caused by federal policies likely resulted in more sexual
license than it curbed. The 1928 Meriam Report, for example, noted that among "the
younger educated Indians, no longer influenced by the old tribal domestic life and
morals, the fluidity of Indian custom and divorce may become simply an opportunity
for license. 48
In addition to the slave and prostitute, there was another imagined "Indian"
woman that motivated policymakers -- the white female captive. One of the most
powerful images in the campaign against the Indian was that of the delicate white
woman at the mercy of the sexually rapacious savage. Captivity narratives, in which
white women recounted tales of kidnapping and rape at the hands of Indian men, were
best- sellers from colonial times throughout the nineteenth century. 49 (Figs. 8 & 9.)
These stories not only confirmed Anglo beliefs in the brutality and wildness of Indians,
but also reinforced the image of white women as frail and sexually pure. 50
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Figs. 8 & 9. Captivity Frontispieces: Mrs. Mary Rowlandson (1682), Mrs. Caroline Harris
(1838); Courtesy of the Newberry Library.
In reality, Indian women often had more to fear from white men than white
women did from Indians. Treatment of white captives varied both among tribes and
within tribes as needs varied, and there are credible reports of torture and mistreatment
at Indian hands.51 But there are more reports remarking on the complete absence of
sexual impropriety or coercion by Indians toward their female captives and willing
marriages of white women to the tribes that had adopted them. While colonial
treaties with Indian tribes often included demands for return of white captives, many of
those "rescued" refused to leave their new Indian families. 53 Such reports cast doubt
on the premise of American superiority behind the colonial project 54 and might even be
modified for their popular audience. Mary Jemison, for example, who happily
remained with the Senecas after her capture at age 15, wrote of the pleasure of a
woman's life among them and the kindness and consideration of the Seneca man to
whom she was married for 50 years.55 But in reprints of her memoir, material was
added to make her husband into a brutal killer. 56 In the same period, the colonists were
capturing and enslaving whole Indian villages without any intention of incorporating
them into their communities.
57
Again and again, however, non-Indians rode to the rescue of women that
existed only in their imaginations. While Julia Martinez was a real woman who sought
to change the membership ordinance that excluded her children before her lawyers
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ever got involved, I want to argue that similar factors may be at work in reactions to
the Martinez case.
First, as discussed above, the position of the Martinezes has been understood
largely according to Western priorities. The Martinez children participated fully in the
58religious and cultural life of the Santa Clara Pueblo, which perhaps even more than
for most tribes, has long been the most important kind of membership in a Pueblo
community. Both Julia Martinez and her Navajo husband Myles remained affiliated
with the Santa Clara Pueblo until their deaths in 2000 and 2001, respectively, and
several of their children still live there.59 While today increased tribal revenue with the
advent of casino gaming may exacerbate the differences between those formally
enrolled and those not,6 the most severe hardship faced by the Martinez children
came, not at the hands of the tribal government, but from the Indian Health Service,
which denied the children medical care for lack of tribal enrollment. 6' This problem,
however, was resolved in 1968, long before the case was filed, when the Bureau of
Indian Affairs gave the Martinezes Indian census numbers. 62 But the indicia of
membership that were familiar and valued in Anglo-American society, voting and
citizenship rights in the government established at federal urging in 1935, were far
more visible and important to the non-Pueblo judges.
Another similarity is the reaction of non-Indians to the case. There is some
evidence that the case got to the Supreme Court only because it involved protection of
women. Several previous cases had challenged membership ordinances that relied on
63percentage of Indian blood. If the equal protection provisions of the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA) were enforced in the same way as those in the U.S. Constitution,
these ordinances would be far more offensive, since racial classifications 64 are entitled
to strict scrutiny, while gender-based ones receive only heightened scrutiny.6 5 But the
circuit courts, even the Tenth Circuit that struck down the Santa Clara Pueblo
ordinance, had little trouble upholding these membership requirements. Before the
passage of the ICRA, moreover, the New York state courts had, with little hand-
wringing, repeatedly upheld Iroquois laws 6Providing that children could only inherit
tribal membership through their mothers. In fact, it appears that among Indian
Reorganization Act membership laws, ordinances that exclude the children of male
tribal members with non-members, while admitting all children of female members,
are more common than those like the Santa Clara ordinance. 67  None of these
ordinances, however, generates publicity or concern similar to that attending the Santa
Clara Pueblo law. 68 It takes a case that calls upon the courts in their role as protectors
of Indian women to do that.
Another reason the Martinez question case may have been, and remains,
particularly troubling is because it clashed with another imagined Indian woman that
had begun to dominate the public imagination -- the Indian woman that was always
powerful and equal, whose suffering is only at the hands of Euro-American oppressors.
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The current Pocahontas, as incarnated by Walt Disney, may stand for this Indian
woman. Wasp-waisted and mini-skirted, this Pocahontas shares the exoticized
sexuality of earlier images, but she is also a woman of power and independence,
mistress of the natural world.
This imagined Indian woman is a necessary correction to past images of Indian
women as exploited drudges and does much to help non-tribal people come to terms
with the unfamiliar power women had in tribal communities. But this modem
imagined Indian woman also poses risks to tribes. No culture is perfect. Some tribal
practices regarding women were troubling by any standard, and even where tribal
traditions promoted gender equality, modem iterations of them may not. Accepting
without question that practices dubbed "traditional" promote gender equality may
make it harder for tribal communities to move beyond this imagined Indian woman to
address problems within their own communities. In her detailed examination of the
Peacemaker Courts of the Navajo Nation, for example, Donna Coker found that the
emphasis on the traditional practice of "talking through" problems to repair
relationships led some Peacemakers to favor maintenance even of abusive relationships
or to encourage women to see the abuse as mutual even when one spouse was being
seriously injured and the other simply resented a perceived lack of respect. 69 One
Peacemaker, moreover, used her understanding of the Navajo Changing Woman story
to say that domestic violence occurred because women assumed men's roles by going
out to work and neglecting their duties at home. While these practices were neither
71
universal nor necessary results of Navajo tradition, uncritical assumptions that
because a practice has been labeled traditional it necessarily promotes gender equality
may have allowed them to persist.
Recent experiments by the Canadian government with "sentencing circles"
intended to incorporate First Nations justice practices into sentencing of their members
have also been critiqued for casting the victim and as responsible for assault or
domestic abuse and seeking to repair relationships in which women are in danger. 72
These experiments are particularly problematic because, unlike Navajo peacemaker
courts, they are initiated and controlled by outsiders to the community, members of the
Canadian government, based on a vague and inaccurate idea of traditional Inuit
justice.73 But the circles have been relatively immune from critique because
[B]y labeling them in some way as belonging within Inuit culture, there
appears to be reluctance on the part of non-Inuit working within the
justice system or within government to scrutinize these alternatives.
This results in a "hands-off' approach. Ironically, these alternatives are
identified and perceived to be mechanisms of self government and
therefore beyond the scrutiny of other levels of government or the
judiciary.74
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The fear within tribal communities of federal deprivation of sovereignty may
also stymie internal critique.75 Outsider pressure thus may hinder the tribal process of
ensuring that ideals of equal respect for the sexes are reflected in tribal practices.
There is some evidence that the attack on the Santa Clara Pueblo's right to enact the
law only strengthened the resolve of the community to justify and cling to it. Paul
Tafoya was Governor of Santa Clara Pueblo at the time of the trial and testified that the
ordinance was "the only way we can protect and preserve our culture." 76 Since then,
he has become a leader in the movement to change the ordinance, arguing in 1997, "[i]t
has caused suffering everywhere. This is not the Indian way of doing things. ' 77 But
twenty-five years later, the membership ordinance remains.
The persistence of the Santa Clara Pueblo ordinance can be contrasted with that
of another Pueblo Tribe, the Hopi Tribe in neighboring Arizona. The Indian
Reorganization Act of the Hopi Tribe Constitution provided that children of Hopi
mothers were eligible for automatic enrollment, while those whose mothers were not
Hopi had to seek approval for membership from the tribal council.78 In 1993,
however, the tribe amended the constitution to provide that all those with one-quarter
Hopi or Tewa ancestry were eligible for membership.79 While one might try to explain
the difference as evidence of the greater power of Hopi men to amend a law that
disadvantaged their offspring, the amendment, along with the broader constitutional
reform of which it was part, was the initiative of a Hopi woman. The current effort
to change the Santa Clara Pueblo law, moreover, is lead by Santa Claran men as much
as it is by women. 8 1 The more plausible explanation for the difference between the two
tribes is that the process of defending the Santa Claran ordinance and the continuous
scrutiny it has received since the 1970s have identified support for the law with support
for sovereignty, making the law more resistant to change from within.
The lesson from all of this is that while non-Indians are particularly moved to
save Indian women from their oppression, they are also particularly blind to the actual
causes of that oppression. These two characteristics are a dangerous combination,
resulting in actions that, even when well-meaning, may only increase the difficulty of
women's lives. There is no easy way out of this dilemma. Culture cannot be a shield
for a thorough examination of the way tribal practices affect women. But neither will
outside courts and legislators provide adequate fora for voicing and addressing these
practices. Indeed, the Santa Clara Pueblo experience suggests that appeal to outside
authorities may shut this discussion down, by casting protests against discrimination as
attacks on sovereignty, rather than demands for equal participation within the
sovereign community. The result is to discourage both the demands and receptivity to
them. Meaningful change must occur instead through the hard work of ensuring that
tribal communities have the power and resources to hear and respond to demands for
reform, and that members of those communities have the ability and willingness to
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articulate their demands. Ensuring security for tribal sovereignty, rather than
threatening its erosion, may be more productive in enabling women to improve their
own lives.
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